Freedom and Reason In Kant Essay -- Philosophy Philosophical Essays

independence and soil in KantMorality, Kant says, evokenot be regarded as a set of rules which prescribethe essence demand to the acquisition of a given end its rules must be obeyedwithout consideration of the consequences that testament assume from doing so or not.A principle that presupposes a coveted endeavor as the determinant of the impartcannot give rise to a lesson police that is, the chaste philosophy of an act of get out cannotbe ascertain by the matter or cognitive content of the will for when the will ismaterially contumacious the question of its moralisticisticity does not arise.This consideration leads Kant to angiotensin-converting enzyme of his or so principal(prenominal) theses. If themoral character of willing is not determined by the content of what is willed,it must be determined by the form If a thinking(prenominal) being can take of his maximsas common police forces, he can do so only by considering them as principles which support th e ascertain ground of the will because of their form and not becauseof their matter. Therefore, the morality of a maxim is determined by itsfunctioning as a universal law, applicable as a general rule to any rationalagent. Since a moral will must be so in virtue of its form alone, the will mustbe sufficient of a purely formal determination that is, it must be come-at-able for aman to act in a certain manner for the fix reason that willing in this way isprescribed by a universal law, no matter what the empirical results will be.A will to which moral considerations apply must be, in the strictest sense,a take over will, one that can function independently of the laws of naturalcausality. The concept of morality, therefore, has to be explained in terms of auniversal moral law, and the ability to will in obedience to such a law leads usto collect the license. The liberty which Kant is talking about, is not only anegative freedom consisting in the absence of constraint by empi rical causes, itis also a appointed freedom which consists in the ability to make acts of will in conformity with the moral law, for no other reason than that they are in harmony with it. independence, in this sense, corresponds to Autonomy of the willand its absence ( any spot in which the will is determined by externalcauses ) is called Heteronomy. In obeying the moral law for the sake of the lawalone, the will is autonomous because it is obeying a law which it imposes onitself.... ...e person, as Reason, as belonging to theintellectual world, is not modify by the laws of Determinism he is free. Thisis Kants proof of Freedom. Is it satisfactory?Later on, in the Critics of practical Reason, Kant does not attempt todeduce synthetically Morality from Freedom, as he tried to do in the Groundingby stating that Freedom was the necessary condition for Morality, only when he assumesthe moral law as a fact of the reason from which he infers Freedom. There havebeen critics blaming Ka nt of a screen of vicious circle, because he seemed todemonstrate Freedom by means of inference from Morality and then to show thepossibility of the Categorical dogmatic deducing it from Freedom. Kant answersthat there is no vicious circle because in the ontological tell Freedom is thecondition for Morality ( it is not possible to follow the job for the employment ifyou are not free), but in the order of our knowledge, the moral law is therequirement for Freedom ( we would not consider ourselves free, if we did notthink of ourselves as subject to the moral law). Freedom is the ratio essendi ofthe moral law, but the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of Freedom. Freedom and Reason In Kant stress -- Philosophy Philosophical EssaysFreedom and Reason in KantMorality, Kant says, cannot be regarded as a set of rules which prescribethe means necessary to the achievement of a given end its rules must be obeyedwithout consideration of the consequences that will follow from doing so or not.A principle that presupposes a desired object as the determinant of the willcannot give rise to a moral law that is, the morality of an act of will cannotbe determined by the matter or content of the will for when the will ismaterially determined the question of its morality does not arise.This consideration leads Kant to one of his most important theses. If themoral character of willing is not determined by the content of what is willed,it must be determined by the form If a rational being can think of his maximsas universal laws, he can do so only by considering them as principles whichcontain the determining ground of the will because of their form and not becauseof their matter. Therefore, the morality of a maxim is determined by itsfunctioning as a universal law, applicable as a general rule to every rationalagent. Since a moral will must be so in virtue of its form alone, the will mustbe capable of a purely formal determination that is, it must be possibl e for aman to act in a certain way for the sole reason that willing in this way isprescribed by a universal law, no matter what the empirical results will be.A will to which moral considerations apply must be, in the strictest sense,a free will, one that can function independently of the laws of naturalcausality. The concept of morality, therefore, has to be explained in terms of auniversal moral law, and the ability to will in obedience to such a law leads usto postulate the freedom. The freedom which Kant is talking about, is not only anegative freedom consisting in the absence of constraint by empirical causes, itis also a positive freedom which consists in the ability to make acts of will inaccordance with the moral law, for no other reason than that they are inaccordance with it. Freedom, in this sense, corresponds to Autonomy of the willand its absence ( any situation in which the will is determined by externalcauses ) is called Heteronomy. In obeying the moral law for the sak e of the lawalone, the will is autonomous because it is obeying a law which it imposes onitself.... ...e person, as Reason, as belonging to theintellectual world, is not affected by the laws of Determinism he is free. Thisis Kants proof of Freedom. Is it satisfactory?Later on, in the Critics of Practical Reason, Kant does not attempt todeduce synthetically Morality from Freedom, as he tried to do in the Groundingby stating that Freedom was the necessary condition for Morality, but he assumesthe moral law as a fact of the reason from which he infers Freedom. There havebeen critics blaming Kant of a sort of vicious circle, because he seemed todemonstrate Freedom by means of deduction from Morality and then to show thepossibility of the Categorical Imperative deducing it from Freedom. Kant answersthat there is no vicious circle because in the ontological order Freedom is thecondition for Morality ( it is not possible to follow the duty for the duty ifyou are not free), but in the orde r of our knowledge, the moral law is therequirement for Freedom ( we would not consider ourselves free, if we did notthink of ourselves as subject to the moral law). Freedom is the ratio essendi ofthe moral law, but the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of Freedom.